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The aim of this work is to analyse the behaviour of agents in highly concentrated 
and strongly regulated electricity wholesale markets with rigid demand. In order to 
accomplish this aim, the analysis was based on the former Spanish electricity generation 
market, between January 1999 and June 2007, before the MIBEL (Iberian Electricity 
Market) has started. The analysis is carried out in the theoretical framework of the structural 
models. Despite the characteristics of this market, the paper suggests that the average high 
mark-ups observed in the period examined were very likely due to the implementation of 
anti-competitive strategies. Therefore, the analysis carried out shows that the opening of a 
wholesale electricity market without the prior increase in the number of market players does 
not prevent, by itself, the manipulation of the market, even when the market is strongly 
regulated. 
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1. Framework 
 
The aim of this study is to analyze the behavior of agents in the Spanish 
electricity market during the period from January 1999 to June 2007 before MIBEL 
(Iberian Electricity Market) started. The main questions that we tried to give an 
answer to are: 
 
 Did market power exercise occur during a long period in this 
market? 
 What kind of long term strategies have been observed during the 
analyzed period? 
 
The analysis is carried out in the theoretical framework of structural models. 
This framework is based on the existence of causal relationships between related 
variables, explained by economic theory. These relationships are, in general terms, 
expressed by the resolution of a system of equations, thus implying economic 
equilibrium. Structural models provide a heuristic and causal approach about the 
market's economic relationships. Then also allowing for the answer to other 
questions, namely for the price elasticity of demand. 
Section 2 presents the organization of the Spanish wholesale market. The 
methodological approaches are presented in section 3, namely the models 
developed. This section includes the survey of the various methodological 
approaches, and presents the particularities of the methodology applied: the research 
is carried out through the structural model methodology, and the results are tested 
with the direct estimations of the main variables. The structural model has two 
equations, one with the demand function and the other with the profit maximization 
function. The price elasticity of demand is estimated in section 4 through the first 
equation. The behavioral factor is estimated in section 5, through the profit 
maximization function 
 
 
2.  Framework 
 
The former Spanish wholesale market can be characterized by being an 
Uniform Price Auction (UPA) Market. In these markets, the generator which sells 
the marginal quantity defines the system marginal price. This price is paid to all 
producers with accepted bids. In that case the price is defined for each hour. This 
market presents a strong regulatory framework. The main regulatory drivers were 
the stranded costs compensations (CTC), (from 1998 (Ley 54/1997), until 2006 
(Real Decreto-ley 7/2006), with a decreasing influence in producers income over 
this period). It also has  to be referred the price cap imposed to the transaction prices 
between producers and buyers belonging to the same companies (Real Decreto-ley 
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3/2006) and the limit imposed at the biggest companies in order to not increase their 
market share (Real Decreto-Ley 6/2000).  
This market was highly concentrated. There were 4 main producers. 
However the two biggest, Endesa and Iberdrola represented about ¾ of the 
production sold in the wholesale market. But their importance tended to decrease 
(75% in 2002 and 60% in 2006). 
 
 
3.  Methodological Aspects 
 
3.1 The Games 
The market for power generation is very much like a market with Cournot 
strategies, with capacity constraints (Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983). Within this 
framework, the quantities correspond to the decision variable. Even when the price 
is assumed as a strategic variable, the results of the strategies are similar to the 
Cournot game, as there is capacity constraint in that kind of market (see Wolak and 
Patrick, 1997). Starting with the Nash-Cournot solution for the Spanish 
oligopolistic market and reprising the Cowling-Waterson formula (1976), the Lerner 
index and the strategies developed by companies can be correlated using the θ4 
index5: 
 
         (1) 
 
in which  is the weighted marginal cost for the industry, HHI the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index and  the factor measuring the level of market power, i.e. which 
corresponds to the Lerner index. In this case, the Lerner index is directly related to 
the level of concentration and also related to the firms’ conjectural variations. In this 
context, if , perfect collusion is verified; when , Cournot 
behaviour is verified r and, finally, when  , a perfectly competitive market 
prevails.  
The interpretation of the producers’ behavior done through the conjectural 
variation methodology presents some particularities. The conjectural variation 
methodology is a static methodology in which agents act according to expectations 
regarding the dynamic responses of competitors. Notwithstanding, this methodology 
can be applied in the present case because the "games” which occur each hour in a 
UPA market, like the former Spanish wholesale market, are similar to a repeated 
                                                 
4
 See, for example, Chern and Just (1980) and Bresnahan (1982) 
5
 This equation is based on the assumption that all companies share the same behavioral factor.  
68 
 
European Research Studies,  Volume XV, Issue 4,Special  Issue on Energy, 2012 
 
game, (see, Fabra and Toro, 2005). And, as referred Perloff et al. (2007, p. 109): 
“…, the theory of repeated games provides a game-theoretic basis for estimating 
static market conduct for conjectural variation models”.  
The issues relating to the interpretation of the value deserve special 
attention.  
 
3.2 The Games 
On the basis of the structural models, equilibrium exists in which the 
economic agents maximise their economic profits taking the demand and cost 
function into account: 
 
                    (2) 
 
In which P is the inverse of the demand function, which depends on the 
quantities Q and a set of variables D, and C is the cost function, which also depends 
on quantities and a set of exogenous variables W which do not influence the price 
function. 
Thus, displaying the behavioural variable θ, the following structural model 
is obtained:  
                                                                                              (3) 
 
In our case, the chosen model corresponds to the system of equations of 
monthly demand and supply, in the Spanish wholesale spot market (daily and intra-
day) for the specified period. Therefore, the application of the structural model 
materialises in this present case in the resolution of the following system: 
 
             (4) 
Where: 
 t, is the time factor related to the month. 
 Zt, is the exogenous variable which allows the demand function to change 
its slope, i.e., which allow to rotate. 
 Dti are explicative variables of the demand function.  
 Wtj, are exogenous explicative marginal cost variables. 
  , is the behavioral parameter, interpreted through the conjectural variation 
methodology: between 0 (Bertrand or perfect competitive strategy) and          
(perfect collusion). 
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Finally, so as to be able to estimate the Lerner index , we apply the 
following equation based on the derivative of the second equation (see Cowling, 
Waterson, 1976): 
 
                    (5) 
 
It is important to note that the need to estimate exogenous explicative 
variables, in the majority of cases underlying economic relations, meant that 
monthly data had to be used, naturally focussing the work on the analysis of 
medium- and long-term equilibriums and strategies.  
In structural models there is an identification issue: a system of equations at 
least one endogenous variable exists. The rank condition have to be warranted to 
overcome this issue: that the exogenous variable excluded from the first equation 
must have a population different to zero in the second equation. To solve this 
problem we have to choose a variable which rotates the demand function in the face 
of an external shock rather than move in parallel:  , being Zt  is the 
rotation variable .. In our case the “rotation” variable is a variable related with the 
temperature variations.  
 
3.3 A Model Extension 
 As previously mentioned, any analysis carried out within this theoretical 
framework is based on a set of assumptions which can influence the results: on 
economic relations, as well as the functional forms of equations that represent the 
model, (see, Corts 1989). 
Therefore, we make use of data which make it possible to estimate with 
some accuracy the marginal cost incurred. This allows the application of the 
structural model used to define market power and the behavioural variable to be 
tested, comparing the results with an almost direct estimate of these variables. 
Parallel to this, following the work of Genesove and Mullin (1998), the estimation 
of the price elasticity of demand based on a linear demand function is tested. In that 
case, the equation which represents demand is solved using a regression of this type: 
  
                     (6) 
 
This regression is not only expressed as a linear functional form but it is also 
expressed as three other functional forms (logarithmic, exponential and quadratic).  
Subsequently, the following regression is resolved, based on the Lerner 
index, in order to estimate the behaviour factor : 
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                (7)  
In which represents the marginal cost (that we estimate as an external 
variable) for month t.  
In order to estimate , equation (8) is applied: 
 
                              (8)       
 
 
4.  Demand Function 
 
4.1 A Brief Description of the Market Organization 
The OMEL6 is the operator of the wholesale market, which is divided into 
the daily market and the intraday market. In the daily market, the electricity 
producers submit bids to sell quantities of electricity on an hourly basis for the 
following day at a minimum price and the buyers (distributors, retailers and eligible 
consumers) submit hourly bids to buy electricity at a maximum price. On the basis 
of these offers, OMEL constructs the hourly curves for the purchase and sale of 
electricity, in which the price at any given hour at which transactions are effected 
(called the system marginal price) results from the crossing of these curves.  
Energy with physical delivery is also transacted through bilateral contracts 
with international entities. The publication of Royal Decree 5/2005 ended the 
obligation to transact all energy in the market regime on the wholesale market, thus 
enabling bilateral contracts to exist with national entities on the margins of this 
market. 
The publication of Royal Decree 5/2005 ended the obligation to transact all 
energy in the market regime on the wholesale market, thus enabling bilateral 
contracts to exist with national entities on the margins of this market. 
On the intraday market the final calculations are made on the actual day in 
order to adjust supply and demand. The intra-daily market consists of 6 blocks of 
offers. The system operator, Red Electrica de España (REE), is responsible for 
resolving any technical constraints, as well as physical adjustments between 
production and consumption. 
Another source of income for producers comes from compensation for the 
availability of declared production (“power guarantee”).  
The final price of the electricity traded on the wholesale market, before 
distribution, comes in the main from the daily and intraday markets which generally 
                                                 
6
 Before the beginning of MIBEL, OMEL was the acronym for: Compañia Operadora del Mercado 
Español de Electricidad, S.A. 
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represent 70% to 80% of this price, with the remainder coming from the guarantee 
of capacity and from the system operation. 
 
4.2 Definition of the Demand Function 
4.2.1 Variables of the Demand Function 
In general, given the linear functional form, the demand function is 
presented as follows: 
                   (9) 
 
In which Pt, is the price of electricity and Wkt another factor k explaining the price 
trend. 
Two distinct phases may be observed:  
 
1. Entry into operation of combined cycle natural gas power plants 
from the beginning of 2004. 
2. Various legislative changes that led to a sharp drop in the quantities 
of electricity traded in these markets from March 2006.  
 
Thus, both in the application of the structural model as in the other case, the 
models were tested for 4 separate periods: 
 
1. January 1999 to June 2007. 
2. January 1999 to February 2006. 
3. January 1999 to December 2003. 
4. January 2004 to June 2007. 
 
Bearing in mind that electricity consumption reflects economic activity, any 
variables which reflect overall7 economic activity in Spain would appear to be the 
best option for explaining the long-term trends in the demand for electricity and 
therefore the Spanish GDP was the obvious choice of variable. However, the GDP is 
a variable for which data is provided quarterly. We sought to overcome this problem 
by estimating the monthly development of the GDP, specifically on the basis of 
other indicators such as industrial production. However, the estimation of the GDP 
on a monthly basis is not a significant variable. 
It is known that in Spain the rate of electricity consumption grew at a pace 
faster than that of the GDP. The intensive increase in energy on this country 
operates in counter-cycle to the main western economies.   Parallel to this, the 
consumption of diesel fuel has also increased by more than the GDP in recent years. 
These facts result from the increased purchasing power in Spain is not reflected in 
                                                 
7
 See for example Jube, 2003 
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any change in the productive structure of the country, mirrored by an increase in the 
energy intensity of the GDP when calculated on the basis of electricity or diesel fuel 
(Mendiluce, et al., 2009) The increase in purchasing power in Spain has been based, 
however, in activities with low added value, such as civil construction. Moreover, 
some studies have shown that consumption of diesel fuel in Spain evolved 
differently from that of other fuels, with a much lower price elasticity of demand, a 
characteristic which it shares with electricity consumption. This was due to the 
indirect support of the Spanish Government subsidies on diesel, compared to other 
fuels, as a way to support investments in the construction industry, particularly 
highways (González-Marrero, et al., 2008).  
Therefore for the period under analysis, diesel fuel was chosen as the 
independent variable for the price of electricity, because it better reflects the 
characteristics of the economic activity in Spain in the recent years. In addition, the 
seasonal nature of this variable is very similar to that of electricity consumption.  
The following graph shows that the trend for the consumption of gas oil and 
electricity developed in a relatively parallel manner up to February 2006, although 
diesel fuel consumption appears more volatile than electricity up to this date. 
 
Figure 1. Volumes of diesel fuel consumed and electricity traded  
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Source: OMEL, Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio  
The consumption of electricity and diesel fuel share some factors that 
explain their variations, which are very much related to cycles of economic activity. 
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The chosen variables partly explain the typical seasonal behavior of the 
demand. The seasonality of demand for electricity is due both to the seasonality of 
economic activity and the evolution of temperature.  
Therefore the feasibility of some variables representative of economic 
seasonality (“Overnight Stays in Hotels", "Industrial Production","Private 
Consumption" and “Working Days”) and temperature (“Average Monthly 
Temperature” and “Temperature Difference”8) was tested. However, some of these 
variables were abandoned as they were not statistically significant (“Working 
Days”, “Average Monthly Temperature”, “Private Consumption” and “Industrial 
Production”). Among the variables above, , two were chosen which reflect the 
annual seasonal nature of the demand for electricity the number of overnight stays in 
hotels each month, whose seasonality develops in inverse proportion to the demand 
for electricity and actual economic activity, and the monthly temperature difference 
in comparison with the average monthly figures. In the structural model, the latter 
variable was also considered the variable that enabled the demand function to 
“rotate” so that the cost component could be identified separately from the strategic 
component  
Figure 2. Electricity traded and variables that define the seasonality Base 100 in January 1999  
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Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas, Ministerio de Industria, Turismo Y Comercio 
The incorporation of the variable “Overnight Stays” (monthly number of 
overnight stays in hotels) in the regression is due to the fact that consumption of 
                                                 
8
 Temperature difference between the average monthly temperature and annual temperature 
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electricity is greater in winter than in summer. As the number of stays is far greater 
in summer than in winter, this variable has an inverse relationship to the amounts of 
electricity consumed, lessening the impact in summer of the variable “Temperature 
Difference” (Difference in temperature each month in comparison with the average 
annual amount). The doubts raised by the introduction of this variable in the model 
led to the use of the Wald test for the deletion of the model explanatory variables, 
proving that there is a relationship between the variables "Overnight Stays" and 
"Temperature Difference ".  
 
Table 1. Wald test for deletion variables 
Overnight stays 6.924 [0.009] 
Temperature 
difference
0.9632 [0.326]
Diesel oil 65.198 [0.000] 
Overnight stays and 
temperature 
difference
12.577 [0.002]
 χ2  [Prob.]
 
 
Table 2 presents the statistics that describe the variables chosen for the 
electricity demand function for the daily and intraday markets:  
 
 Number of overnight stays in hotels each month, “Overnight 
stays".  
 Difference of temperature between the average monthly 
temperature and annual temperature, "Temperature Difference ".  
 Diesel fuel consumed in each month, "Diesel".  
 Amount of electricity traded in the daily and intraday markets 
each month, "Amount of electricity."  
 Average price of electricity traded in the daily and intraday 
markets each month, “Electricity Price".  
 
In addition to these variables, a dummy variable must also be considered, 
which represents the change in the regulatory framework for these markets with the 
entry into force of Royal Decree-Law 3/. 
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Table 2. Correlation coefficients  
Diesel Overnight stays     Difference of 
temperature      
Amount of 
electricity     
Electricity price        
Diesel 1.000 -0.30778 0.18648 0.88107 0.44659
Overnight stays     -0.30778 1.000 0.15409 -0.024948 0.079977
Difference of temperature      0.18648 0.15409 1.000 0.43088 0.24784
Amount of electricity     0.88107 -0.024948 0.43088 1.000 0.51977
Electricity price        0.44659 0.079977 0.24784 0.51977 1.000  
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
Difference of 
temperature
Overnight stays Electricity 
price
Diesel Amount of 
electricity
Observations 102 102 102 102 102
Unit: Celcius Número €/MWh t GWh
Minimum 0.03 9 797 643 18.25 1 795 801 13 322
Maximum 11.88 37 636 212 73.33 3 348 391 25 387
Average 5.72 19 621 752 36.83 2 542 182 18 546
Median 6.00 19 515 610 35.28 2 536 045 18 181
Standard deviation 3.03 7 543 818 12.59 360 072 2 443
Variance 9.19 5.69E+13 158.50 1.30E+11 5 969 390
Kurtosis -0.96 -0.93 0.55 -0.81 -0.22
Skewness -0.07 0.42 1.00 -0.06 0.38  
 
 
4.2.2 Stationarity of the Demand Function 
In time series, problems arising out of the spurious relationships are 
common, taking the form of variables with very high correlations that lack any 
causal relationship between them.The stationarity of each variable is tested using the 
ADF (Augmented Dick Fuller) unit root test, with the order of the test chosen by 
taking into account the combined analysis of Akaike and Schwartz information 
criteria.  
Seasonal variations are analysed without trend, whilst the remainder are 
analysed with trend. Given its specific nature, the price variable is analysed with and 
without trend. The following table shows that there are two variables for which we 
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cannot reject the null hypothesis of unit root: variables “Amount of electricity” and 
“Electricity Price” (with trend).  
 
Table 4. ADF tests for the demand function variables 
Amount of 
electricity
Price of electricity
(1)
Price of 
electricity
(2)
Diesel oil Overnight stays Temperature 
difference
Choosen order 6 0 0 6 6 4
Trend Yes No Yes Yes No No
Statistic test -3.4089 -1.6893 -2.4479 -7.2726 -7.9847 -4.1163
Critical value for the ADF statitistic -3.4666 -2.8981 -3.4666 -3.4666 -2.8918 -2.8918  
 
All variables in first difference are stationary.  
Table 5. ADF tests for variables integrated of order 1 
Amount of 
electricity
Price of electricity Diesel oil Overnight stays Temperature 
difference
Choosen order 5 4 6 3 6
Statitistic test -5.2783 -5.3921 -6.7172 -6.1681 -4.5459
Critical value for the ADF statistic -2.8986 -2.8986 -2.8986 -2.8986 -2.8986  
 
Thus, the variables are characterized as follows in terms of integration: 
"Amount of electricity" and "Price of electricity" are I (1). 
"Diesel", Temperature Difference and "Overnight Stays" are I (0). 
Thus, since there are two variables I (1) in the model, the stationarity 
analysis is carried out through testing the existence of a cointegration relationship. 
In economic terms, it can easily be understood that in the short and medium 
term the demand for electricity and its price varies in inverse proportion in the short 
and medium term and this relationship is measured by the elasticity of the demand 
price. However, in the long-term, this inverse relationship can no longer be verified. 
Thus, if an inverse relationship between the long-term price and demand for 
electricity is considered, and a continuous growth in demand is maintained, this will 
be reflected in a lowering of the price of electricity, until it tends to become null. 
However, this trend is not verified; on the contrary, the increase in demand has been 
accompanied by an increase in the price of electricity, although not always at the 
same pace. This trend is understandable. The increase in the demand for electricity 
has been satisfied by recourse to more expensive production technologies (such as 
renewable energies) or by conventional fossil fuel technologies (natural gas, coal, 
fuel oil) which, in turn, are limited and have tended to become more expensive due 
to the limited reserves. 
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The test for the existence of a cointegration relationship between the 
variables follows Johansen’s methodology (Johansen, 1988).  
The statistics9 presented in the tables below clearly enable the H0 
hypothesis of the non-existence of a co-integration relationship to be rejected, 
meaning that the H0 hypothesis for the existence of more than one co-integration 
relationship also cannot be accepted.  
 
Table 6. Maximal Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix for a VAR model of order 1 
H0 H1 Statistic Critical value 
95%
Critical value 
90%
r = 0 r=1 93.33 25.77 23.08
r <= 1 r=2 4.71 12.39 10.55  
 
 
Table 7. Trace of the Stochastic Matrix for a VAR model of order 1 
H0 H1 Statistic Critical value 
95%
Critical value 
90%
r = 0 r=1 98.04 19.22 17.18
r <= 1 r=2 4.71 12.39 10.55  
 
Thus, one can consider that the variables "Price of electricity" and “Amount 
of electricity” are co-integrated, i.e.: .  
We have to remember that this research focuses on medium or long term 
strategies. In other words, we seek to establish a "strategic summary" of the different 
strategies that have occurred in that “repeated game”. Therefore, we do not need to 
examine the situations of short-term imbalances. Moreover, there is loss of degree of 
freedom when the data is monthly based, and there is 102 observations at most. The 
complexity of a model like a ECM model when applied to analyze changes of short 
term strategies (namely a Switching Model type used by Porter (1983)) may not be 
appropriate taking into account the range of assumptions on the variables and the 
assignment of different states (war or collusion) to the key variables (price, income) 
that define the state changes. 
The “simple” linear demand form (not taking into consideration 
“Temperature Difference" as a variable that "rotate" the function) estimated through 
the OLS is:  
 
        (10) 
 
                                                 
9
 Based on a likelihood ratio test 
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4.2.3 Instrumental Variable 
Once the variables incorporated in the demand models have been defined, it 
is important to ensure the orthogonality of the model. This exercise is effected 
within the framework of structural models, in which, as we have seen, identification 
of the models requires compliance with the order condition Therefore, an analysis of 
the endogeneity of the variables in the first equation must be carried out and the 
instrumental variables defined, in addition integrating the exogenous variables 
which are part of the second equation. 
The exogeneity of the variables in the equation that might be endogenous 
was tested, since they underscored an economic relationship with other variables, 
“Electricity Price”, "Overnight Stays" and “Diesel”. It was considered “Temperature 
Difference” as an exogenous variable. 
An initial group of instrumental variables must be constituted which respect 
the following restrictions: on the one hand, they must not be correlated with the, 
“Amount of electricity” dependent variable in the first equation, but with 
“Electricity Price”. On the other hand, they will include the exogenous variables in 
the second equation. In this way, the two restrictions are respected; the exogenous 
variable is excluded from one equation but included in the other (Reiss and Wolak, 
2005). The following variables were defined in this group: 
 
 The average monthly price (Eur/bbl) of Brent crude “Oil 
Price”, with a 3 months lag.  
 The monthly average price (Eur/t) of coal “Coal Price”, with 3 
and 12 months lags.  
 The monthly average hydro electrical productivity, “Hydro”.  
 In the section related to the definition of the second equation, 
the reasons for choosing those variables are explained.  
 
A second group of instrumental variables was defined, related to the 
consumption of diesel fuel and overnight stays. In this case, we chose the 
instrumental variables that capture the seasonality of these variables and the 
economic activity:  
 
 The variables “Diesel” and "Overnight Stays" are 12 months 
lagged.  
 The monthly trend for the industrial production index, variable 
“Industrial Production”, and the estimated of monthly GDP, 
variable "GDP".  
 
The inclusion of instrumental variables with lags allows us to consider the 
short-term adjustments, thus taking the dynamic nature of the model.  
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The table below shows that “GDP” and “Industrial Production” 
instrumentals variables are stationary as “Diesel” and “Overnight Stays”. The results 
of the statistical T2 Wu-Hausman Test, given by the F statistics, reject the 
hypothesis of the non endogeneity of the model.  
 
Table 8. ADF test for instrumental variables: GDP and Industrial Production 
GDP Industrial 
production
Choosen order 4 2
Trend Yes Yes
Statitistic test -8.963 -9.483
Critical value for the ADF 
statistic -3.467 -3.467  
 
 
Table 9. T2 Wu Hausman Test and T-ratio for residuals 
Diesel oil residuals -2.2017 [0.031]
Electricity price residuals 1.7372 [0.087]
Overnight stays residuals -1.2682 [0.209]
Residuals T-ratio [Prob.]
T2 Wu-Hausman Statistic
 F( 3,  66)=   3,7099 [0,016]
 
 
Thus, even outside the theoretical framework of structural models, the 
confirmed existence of endogeneity in the demand function requires the application 
of the Two-Stage Least Square method. The instrumental variables chosen are those 
previously referred to, with the exception of the “overnight stays” variable with 12 
months lagg, as this variable is not endogenous. 
Bearing in mind the significant number of instrumental variables, the 
overestimation of the model was tested. The results allowed us to not reject the null 
hypothesis of all the instrumental variables being exogenous.  
 
 
4.3 The Demand Function in the Structural Model Context 
4.3.1 Results Obtained 
As previously stated, two events characterised the wholesale electricity 
market during the period under analysis: the introduction of combined cycle natural 
gas plants from the beginning of 2004 and the various changes in legislation which 
led to a sharp fall in the amounts of electricity traded on these markets from March 
2006. 
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Thus, both in the implementation of the structural model, as in the other 
case, the models were tested for 4 separate periods as we already mentioned. 
The impact of the changes to the framework of the daily and intraday 
markets from March 2006 onwards is analysed with the inclusion of a dummy 
variable. 
 Based on equation (3) and assuming a linear demand function, the demand 
function will be given by, (model 1):  
 
                                             
(11) 
 
Being: 
, is t “Amount of electricity” variable, in the month t.  
, is “Electricity Price” variable, in the month t. 
 , is “Diesel” variable in the month t.  
, is “Temperature Difference” variable in the month t. 
, is "Overnight Stays" variable in the month t.  
 
However, as we shall see, most of the variables are not significant when the 
model is presented in this way. Thus, we opted for a model in which the variable 
Temperature Difference is only included as a rotation variable (model 2): 
 
      (12) 
                                                       
The regression was performed for the demand function. The results of the 
regressions are only presented when the level of significance of the price variable is 
equal to or less than 5%. The chosen model is shaded in orange.  The selection 
criterion is the level of significance of the variable “Electricity Price”. The chosen 
models are generally more robust than the others. For the period between January 
1999 and December 2003, we obtained significant results for both models. The 
analyses beyond December 2003 don’t present significant results. This is not 
surprising given that since 2004, the framework of Spanish electricity market has 
changed several times in Spain, and the market could not be considered, even in 
long-term perspective, as being in equilibrium. For the above, the period chosen for 
analysis is the period between January 1999 and December 2003. 
Therefore, the analysis is only made for this period. 
The table below shows that in the case of the equation of "Model 1", in the 
chosen period, only the variable “Diesel” is significant for a 10% level of 
significance, whist in "Model 2", all variables with the exception of  theconstant are 
significant to this level. The structural model is then applied to “Model 2”, for the 
period between January 1999 and December 2003.  
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Table 10. Comparison of the results of the regression "models 1 and 2" for the chosen period 
(January 1999 to December 2003) 
Estimate t test  [Prob.] Estimate t test  [Prob.]
Constant 3620.7 0.1803 [0.858] 874.3508  .31121 [0.757]
Pt -1298.1 -0.3188 [0.751] -735.5126 -3.1054 [0.003]
Dormt 4.9648 0.7977 [0.430] 5.6684  1.7674 [0.084]
Dieselt 0.0064399 2.3929 [0.021] 0.0067753 6.4709 [0.000]
Model 1 Model 2
 
 
4.3.2 Results Obtained 
From equation (12) two parameters were obtained that are essential for the 
model as a whole: the inverse of the slope of demand function and the price 
elasticity of demand. The first parameter stems from the following equation:  
 
                           (13)                                                                                                       
 
In which , is the ratio of the average market prices and quantities traded and 
, is the average temperature differences. In this case, = -0,0933. 
The second parameter is obtained as follows:  
 
                                     (14) 
 
In the following section, the value of price elasticity of demand is compared 
with the values obtained with the application of the model not belonging to the 
structural model.  
 
 
4.4 The Demand Function Outside the Structural Model 
The demand function is defined outside the framework of the structural 
model in the strictu-senso. The model is not only be developed for a functional form, 
but the functional forms considered in the work of Genesove and Mullin (1998) are 
also presented (linear, exponential, quadratic and exponential). The equations were 
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adapted to this work in order to take into account independent variables other than 
price. The results, in particular relating to price elasticity of demand, are compared 
with each other, and also compared with results obtained by applying the structural 
model. It should be stressed, however, that for reasons of comparability with 
previous results, the instrumental variables were maintained. 
 
4.4.1 The Equations 
The general functional form is given by equation (15). 
 
                   (15) 
In which,  measures the size of the market demand,  is the maximum 
willingness to pay, Pt is the price and  is the convexity index.  tends to infinity 
and  is a constant. 
In this study, the general equation for linear and quadratic functional forms 
is given by:   
           (16) 
 
in which  is the coefficient of the relationship between the independent variable 
 and the monthly amounts traded on the daily and intra-daily markets, and γ is 
equal to 1 and 2 in the linear and quadratic equations, respectively. Remember that 
the independent variables are “Price Electricity", "Overnight Stays", “Diesel” and a 
dummy variable whenever the period under analysis includes the year 2006. 
The price elasticity of demand in the linear form, in this case corresponds to:  
 
                         (17) 
 
In the case of the quadratic form, the price elasticity of demand is given by: 
 
              (18) 
 
In this work, the generic equation that supports the logarithmic functional 
form is given by:  
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                (19) 
 
Using logarithms: 
 
                      (20) 
 
In this case, the price elasticity of demand is obviously given by:  
                             (21) 
 
In this paper, the generic equation of the exponential functional form is 
given by: 
+                 (22) 
Using logarithms: 
          (23) 
 
The price elasticity of demand corresponds to:  
 
          (24) 
 
 
4.4.2 Results 
The regression of the demand function was performed for each functional 
form. As in the previous section, the results of regressions were only presented 
whenever the level of significance of the variable price is equal to or less than 5%. 
Only in these cases the price elasticity of demand will be used in solving the 
equation (8). The tests performed are the same as presented in the previous section. 
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For each case, the selection criterion is the degree of significance of the 
variable “price electricity”10. The conclusions are very similar to those arising from 
the implementation of the structural model: 
 
 The chosen models presented are generally more robust 
than the others.  
 For the period between January 1999 and December 2003 
significant results were obtained for all functional forms 
other than quadratic form. 
 
The table below shows the price elasticity of demand calculated for the 
chosen periods and functional forms. The figures for the different functional forms 
are similar, between -0.089 and -0.099. The value calculated for the structural model 
for a linear equation, falls within this interval. 
Table 11. Price elasticities of demand11 
 
-0.0886 No
-0.0982 No
-0.0986 No
-0.0933 Yes
logarithmic Jan-1999_Dec-2003
Exponential Jan-1999_Dec-2003
Linear Jan-1999_Dec-2003
Price elesticity 
of demand
Equation Structural 
model
Functional form Period
Linear Jan-1999_Dec-2003
 
 
Those value are close to the values generally associated to the elasticity of 
demand in the electricity sector (in that case based on hourly data), around 10% (see 
Borenstein, Bushnell and Knittel (1999) or Patrick and Wolak (1997)). For the 
Spanish electricity sector, and also for hourly data, Alcalde et al (2002) defined 3% 
as the average elasticity of demand in 1998, and Khün and Machado (2003) 
estimated that the elasticity of demand was between 1.5% and 9% in 2001.  
 
 
5.  Optimality Equation 
 
5.1 The Structural Model 
Due to the problems in identifying structural models, in this context the 
supply equation must include the demand rotation component. Thus, the second 
equation of the system (6) has the following representation: 
                                                 
10
 The presentation of the statistical tests is out of the scope of the present paper. 
11
 The results outside the strucutural model is without the rotation variable. 
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      (25)                                                                 
 
The Cmgj variables represent the factors required to calculate the marginal 
cost. The second variable on the right side of the equation corresponds to demand. 
The last variable is the rotation variable for the demand function whose parameters 
were defined in resolving the demand equation. The coefficient of this variable 
corresponds to the behavioral variable. The marginal cost of the system is defined by 
the production costs of the power plant which define the closing price of the market.  
The production of electricity is a capital intensive business where 
investment costs represent most of the costs, and variable costs correspond almost 
entirely to fuel costs.  
As stated in the previous section, the power plants with conventional 
technologies which set the closing price are the coal and fuel oil power plants, 
natural gas combined cycle power plants and hydro plants. Thus, the variables 
chosen to estimate the average marginal cost of the system are: 
 
 The average monthly price, EUR/bbl, of Brent oil with 3 
months lag, which represents the cost of natural gas combined 
cycle power plants and the cost of fuel oil power plants. It is 
common practice for natural gas supply contracts to index their 
prices to the price of oil or its derivatives, with time lag 
between 3 and 6 months. Moreover, the oil price is not 
reflected immediately in the marginal cost of fuel oil power 
plants on the one hand, since this is a derivative and, on the 
other hand, due to the stock management policy of these 
plants.  
 For coal power plants, the monthly average price of coal with a 
3 months lag in, Eur/t, in order to reflect the stock management 
policy.  
 Hydro coefficient, bearing in mind the importance of 
hydrological production. 
 
The latter variables are exogenous to the model, having been included as 
instrumental variables in the previous equation. We chose variables that are directly 
related to a theoretical system marginal cost, because this is not necessarily the 
actual marginal cost incurred. In the first case, the marginal cost only depends on the 
factors which influence the variable costs of production of the power plants which 
set the market prices: average prices of fuels and average hydro (hydrological 
inflows) observed in that month. In practice, the marginal cost of the system will 
also depend on technical constraints and company strategies. These factors should 
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be included into the behavioral variable λ. Thus, equation (25) can be rewritten as 
follows:  
 
                                   (26) 
 
Whereby: 
, is the average monthly price of Brent crude lagged 3 months.  
, is the average monthly Coal API # 2 NW Europe lagged 3 
months.  
, is the hydro inflows in the month t. 
, is the behavioral variable. 
 
The latter variables are exogenous to the model, having been included as 
instrumental variables in the previous equation. We chose variables that are directly 
related to a theoretical system marginal cost, because this is not necessarily the 
actual marginal cost incurred. In the first case, the marginal cost only depends on the 
factors which influence the variable costs of production of the power plants which 
set the market prices: average prices of fuels and average hydro (hydrological 
inflows) observed in that month. In practice, the marginal cost of the system will 
also depend on technical constraints and company strategies. These factors should 
be included into the behavioral variable λ. Thus, equation (25) can be rewritten as 
follows:  
 
                                   (26) 
Whereby: 
, is the average monthly price of Brent crude lagged 3 months.  
, is the average monthly Coal API # 2 NW Europe lagged 3 
months.  
, is the hydro inflows in the month t. 
, is the behavioral variable. 
 
 
5.1.1 Variables of the Supply Function 
Both the price of coal and the price of oil followed an upward trend during 
the period under analysis. Note, however, that this trend was more mitigated for the 
period between January 1999 and December 2003, for which the model was applied. 
For its part, the hydro is characterized by instability around the unit. 
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Figure 3. Variables that characterize the marginal cost 
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The table below shows that the variables are weakly correlated. 
Table 12. Variables correlation coefficient 
Coal price (-3)  Coal price (-12)    Oil price (-3)  Hydro      Overnight stays     Difference of 
temperature      
Amount of 
electricity     
Coal price (-3)  1.000 0.49657 0.37879 -0.15651 0.024733 0.073055 0.53131
Coal price (-12)    0.49657 1.000 0.54121 -0.38592 0.0004151 0.070356 0.5765
Oil price (-3)  0.37879 0.54121 1.000 -0.05824 -0.016976 0.11474 0.46533
Hydro      -0.15651 -0.38592 -0.05824 1.000 -0.26575 -0.33473 -0.23867
Overnight stays     0.024733 0.0004151 -0.016976 -0.26575 1.000 0.15409 -0.024948
Difference of temperature      0.073055 0.070356 0.11474 -0.33473 0.15409 1.000 0.43088
Amount of electricity     0.53131 0.5765 0.46533 -0.23867 -0.024948 0.43088 1.000  
 
The descriptive statistics for the variables which define marginal cost are 
shown in the following table. It is observed that the average hydro inflows was only 
0.82 during the period under review, this period was remarkably dry. 
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Table 13. Descriptive statistics of variables 
Hydro index Oil price Coal price
Observations 102 102 102
Unit: - €/bbl €/t
Minimum 0.110 8.659 25.160
Maximum 2.200 53.942 63.484
Average 0.819 30.369 43.177
Median 0.680 27.148 44.701
Standard deviation 0.461 10.625 10.520
Variance 0.212 112.895 110.671
Kurtosis 0.914 -0.427 -1.149
Skewness 1.122 0.514 -0.147  
 
 
5.1.2 Stationarity of the Supply Function 
The tables that follow show that the variable “Hydro index inflows” is the 
only stationary variable which defines the marginal cost. 
 
Table 14. ADF tests for the variables of the supply function 
Oil Price
(1)
Oil Price
(2) 
Coal Price
(1)
Coal Price
(2)
Hydro index
Choosen order 0 0 1 1 4
Trend No Yes No Yes No
Statistic test -1.317 -1.740 -2.095 -2.117 -4.428
Critical value for 
the ADF statitistic -2.898 -3.467 -2.898 -3.467 -2.898  
 
The variable prices of oil and coal are integrated of order 1. 
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Table 15. ADF tests for the variables of the supply function integrated order 1 - 85 observations 
Oil Price I(1)
(1)
Oil Price I(1)
(2) 
Coal Price I(1)
(1)
Coal Price I(1)
(2) 
Choosen order 0 0 0 0
Trend No Yes No Yes
Statistic test -8.152 -8.139 -5.257 -5.218
Critical value for the 
ADF statitistic -2.899 -3.467 -2.899 -3.467  
 
Using the Johansen approach, and a VAR model of order 1, as indicated by 
the information criteria, the statistics presented in the tables below clearly allow the 
H0 hypotheses for the non-existence of one and two co-integration relationships to 
be clearly rejected, and point out that the H0 hypothesis for the existence of more 
than two co-integration relationships cannot be accepted.  
Thus, two co-integration vectors exist which support the relationship already 
demonstrated between the price and amount of electricity variables ; 
as well as the co-integration relationship between coal and oil prices: 
 
 
Table 16. Eigen value test for a VAR model of order 1 
H0 H1 Statistic Critical value 
95%
Critical value 
90%
r = 0 r=1 29.03 27.42 24.99
r <= 1 r=2 27.65 21.12 19.02
r <= 2 r=3 3.31 14.88 12.98
r <= 3 r=4 1.71 8.07 6.50  
 
 
Table 17. Trace test VAR for a VAR model of order 1 
H0 H1 Statistic Critical value 
95%
Critical value 
90%
r = 0 r=1 61.70 48.88 45.70
r <= 1 r=2 32.67 31.54 28.78
r <= 2 r=3 5.02 17.86 15.75
r <= 3 r=4 1.71 8.07 6.50  
 
 
90 
 
European Research Studies,  Volume XV, Issue 4,Special  Issue on Energy, 2012 
 
5.1.3 Instrumental Variables 
As part of the structural model, equation (26) is solved with a two-stage 
least-squares model. Thus the identification of this equation requires that the 
exogenous variables defined in the other equation in the model should be considered 
instrumental variables. Remember that these variables were: "Overnight Stays", 
“Diesel” and "Temperature Difference". The latter can already be found indirectly in 
equation in the demand variable rotation. So instead we used the average monthly 
temperature. Note that this variable may also serve as an instrumental variable for 
the hydro inflows. 
It should be noted, however, that unlike the case of the demand equation, in 
this case the results of the Wu-Hausman statistics did not reject the possibility that 
the equation did not suffer from endogeneity. With regard to the variables in 
particular, the hypothesis of a non-endogenous variable was only rejected in the case 
of the t statistic for the demand (“Amount of electricity”). 
Table 18. Wu Hausman T2 test 
Hydro residuals  1.4842 [0.146]
Coal price residuals 0.2202 [0.827]
Oil price residuals 0.15004 [0.882]
Amount of electricity 
residuals 2.4569 [0.019]
Rotation variable 
residuals -1.1293 [0.266]
Statistic T2 Wu-Hausman
F(3,39) = 7.4746 [0.188]
T-ratio for residuals [Prob.]
 
 
It should be noted that the test to the overestimation of the model do not 
reject the null hypothesis that all instrumental variables are exogenous. 
 
5.1.4 Behavioural Parameter 
We tested several models for different instrumental variables. The chosen 
model presents a level of significance lesser than 10% for the rotation variable of the 
demand, which can be interpreted as robust by the statistical tests conducted.  
In this model, for 48 observations (up to December 2003), the variables are 
not very significant; particularly those variables related to fuel prices. However, 
when we extend the series until February 2006 (72 observations), all variables 
become more significant. It can equally be observed that consideration over a longer 
period of time does not alter the coefficient attributed to the rotation variable, which 
enables the behavioural factor to be defined. This value lies at around 0.054, 
indicating a competitive market. 
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Table 19. Chosen regression 
Coefficient T-ratio  [Prob.] Coefficient T-ratio  [Prob.]
Constant -4.5369 -.75148 [0.457] 0.81635 -1.9208 [0.061]
Oil price (-3) 0.010074 0.2825 [0.779] -0.039856  -1.9571 [0.054]
Coal price (-3) 0.049354 0 .3497 [0.728] 0.14786 4.8609 [0.000]
Hydro -2.3575 -2.4650 [0.018] 0.053211  2.4592 [0.016]
Amount of electricity 0.0006352  1.7757 [0.083] 0.0002727   .1526E-3             1.7863 [0.079]
Variable of rotation 0.053596      1.7591 [0.086] 0.053211 2.4592 [0.016]
January 1999 - December 2003 January 1999 - December 2003
 
 
5.1.5 Learner Index in the Period 1999-2003 
Having estimated the behavioral factor for the analyzed period (about 
0.0535) and the price elasticity of demand (-0.0933), it remains to define the 
Herfindahl Index, HHI, in order to estimate the Lerner index solving the equation 
(5). The Herfindahl Index was calculated by economic group based on data from 
OMEL and the Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio. Register that this index 
was only calculated for conventional producers, i.e., the power plants with positive 
environmental externalities (special regime) were not considered because the pay of 
their production was formed independently of the market prices, although part of 
this type of production was already traded on the market by this time. 
Figure 4. Evolution of the Herfindahl index 
10%
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35%
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
 
Source: OMEL, Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio 
Thus, the average HHI weighted by the production is equal to 30.5%. 
Applying equation (5), the Lerner index is 17.4%. The Lerner index associated with 
it is relatively high, despite the fact that the estimation of the producers’ behavior 
approaches a Bertrand’s game. We can conclude that given the conditions of the 
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wholesale Spanish electricity market, namely the rigidity of demand and the high 
concentration, the discretion enjoyed by producers to get a high mark-up is wide.At 
this point, it is important to note that the concentration level of a market may be 
related to the efficiency of its agents and, consequently, the marginal cost and 
market structure will be two endogenous variables (see, for example, Church and 
Ware, 2000), distorting any behavioural analysis based on the Herfindahl Index. 
However, during the period under analysis, in the Iberian Peninsula the market 
structure for energy production does not result from competitive pressures, as is the 
case in the rest of Europe, but from the structure of the existing market before 
liberalisation. Furthermore, the technologies for producing electricity are shared by 
producers, and the efficiency of electricity producers is more dependent on the 
portfolio of technologies that on the efficiency of the power plants. Thus, in this 
case, it is assumed that there’s no an endogenous relationship between market 
concentration and the marginal costs.  
 
 
5.2 Estimation of the Behavioural Outside the Structural Model 
5.2.1 Marginal Cost Calculation 
The definition of marginal cost is one of the main difficulties for the 
implementation of structural models. This is why we also estimate the cost function 
outside the model.  
The marginal cost of a market can reflect the structure of the production 
costs for this market or only correspond to the marginal cost of the electricity 
generating power station that has sold electricity at the highest price, which 
corresponds to the marginal power station. The latter type of market corresponds to 
the “Uniform Price Market” and, as we already referred, it is the kind of market that 
has been operating in Spain.In this kind of market, the marginal cost of the market is 
very close to the cost variable for the power station which sets the market price. In 
monthly terms, marginal cost corresponds to the weighted average for the amounts 
traded at any given hour in the marginal cost schedule:  
 
                   (27) 
 
in which  is the weighted marginal cost of the market in the month t, n is the 
number of hours h, is the month t,  is the marginal cost of the market at the 
hour h,  is the cost variable for the marginal power station the hour h and  is 
the amount traded on the market at the hour h.   
OMEL, the operator for the Spanish daily and intraday markets, defines the 
origins of the electricity that has set the market price for each hour, i.e., the marginal 
offer, and groups them by technology type., However, the information supplied by 
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OMEL does not distinguish between certain technologies which define the closing 
price, namely between the coal and fuel oil power plants. 
Moreover, OMEL provides the amounts traded on the daily and intraday 
markets.  In this way, the variable  equation (27) is known. However, the 
definition of variable  is based on a set of assumptions that can be grouped into:  
 
1. Definition of the variable cost function associated with 
the technology / type of marginal plant. 
2. Definition of parameters required to calculate the 
variable cost. 
 
 
5.2.2 Definition of the Variable Cost Function Associated with the 
Technology/Type of Marginal Plant 
The information provided by OMEL does not establish with certainty what 
type of power plant defines the system marginal cost, especially in the case of 
thermal power plants, of contracts concluded by the REE and power plants with 
renewable energy sources.  
On another hand, the costs of hydroelectric power plants with pumping 
cannot be directly deduced from the information provided because they are 
associated to the hourly marginal costs during which the hydro power plant acquired 
energy to refill its reservoir. Thus, it was necessary to develop a set of assumptions 
that allows to associate different technologies and consequently different functions 
of the variable costs to the nomenclature presented by OMEL for the source of 
energy that sets the system marginal price (following Borenstein, et al., 2002; 
Steiner, 2000; Wolfram, 1999, among others, etc...). These assumptions12 were 
grouped in two groups to ensure that the marginal cost actually occurring during this 
period did not exceed the range presented. The presentation of the rules defining the 
marginal central is out the scope of this paper.  
In short, in any case, only four types of technology define the market price 
during the period under review:  
 
 Oil-fired power plant;  
 Coal power plants;  
 Combined-cycle natural gas power plants;  
 Hydro plants.  
 
In parallel with the technologies that define the market price, it’s important 
to set the variable cost function of marginal technologies. The variable cost of a 
thermal power plant will depend on four factors: its load, its efficiency for that load, 
                                                 
12
 Is has to be highlighted that the assumptions were made in order to not underestimate the variables 
costs and, therefore, overestimate the mark-up. 
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the heating value of the fuel consumed and the price of the fuel. Assuming that the 
central i, which sets the market price at full capacity, the function of the variable 
cost at a determined hour, h, of this power plant,  , is defined as follows13: 
 
                    (28) 
                                                                              
Where,  corresponds to the price of fuel j,  is the calorific 
value of fuel j,  is the efficiency of the central and O&M the maintenance and 
operation variable costs. The costs of O&M are known and relatively stable.  
Regarding the price of fuel consumed, this depends largely on the 
acquisition policy of the producer.  Furthermore, we have to refer the particular case 
of the coal consumed in Spain. Much of this coal is domestic and has a cost of 
extraction and a calorific value that make it less competitive the imported coal, 
obliging the subsidization of its consumption by the Spanish government.  
Meanwhile, the case of hydro power plants must be highlighted. The 
variable costs of these plants are near zero, and are merely related to maintenance 
and operation costs. In most cases, these plants are associated with reservoirs, with 
greater or lesser capacity to retain water, which corresponds to potential energy. In 
periods when the level of reservoirs is automatically reset, i.e. in periods of strong 
hydro inflows, which in the Iberian Peninsula represent some periods of the winter 
or spring, the value of the water held in reservoirs is almost zero. However, in other 
periods, it becomes a scarce resource, which should give it a value when used in the 
production of electricity. This value corresponds to the cost of the replaced 
technology.  
Thus, there is an important set of unknowns in the setting the price of fuel. 
In order to overcome this situation, we follow three approaches for calculating the 
monthly variable cost. Two approaches are based on costs of production and 
generation efficiency patterns. In the third approach we use data related to the costs 
of production for the equivalent power plants in Portugal which are known. The first 
two approaches only differ by the value given to marginal cost of the hydro power 
plant, i.e., the costs of the replaced technology.  
In short, the marginal cost of the system was calculated in three ways:  
1. For production valued at the cost of the conventional power plants (coal, 
fuel oil) or combined cycle natural gas plants, the production costs are 
calculated on the basis of the average market prices for the fuels and the 
standard values for O&M costs and the revenue of the power stations. 
Production from hydroelectric plants is valued at the production costs 
for the plants (which correspond to O&M costs), with the exception of 
months in which hydro inflows is significantly below the average for the 
                                                 
13
 During the analysed period, CO2 costs were not yet recovered. 
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“dry” period of the water resources year, which are valued at the cost of 
the fuel oil plants. This approach is referred to as “marginal cost (a)”. 
2. The previous point also applies to hydroelectric production, which is 
valued at the cost of the fuel oil power plants, with the exception of 
months in which hydro inflows significantly, is above the average for 
the “wet” period of the water resources year, which are valued at the 
production cost of the hydroelectric plants (O&M costs). This approach 
s referred to as “marginal cost (b)”.  
3. For production valued at the cost of conventional power plants (coal, 
fuel oil) or combined cycle natural gas plants, the production costs are 
defined on the basis of costs verified in Portugal for equivalent 
technologies during the same period. The production of hydroelectric 
plants is valued at the hydroelectric plant production cost (which 
corresponds to O&M costs), with the exception of months in which a 
hydro inflows significantly below the average for the “dry” period of the 
water resources year. This approach is referred to as “marginal cost 
Portugal”. 
 
 
5.2.3 Behavioural Factor 
At this section the regression (7) is solved in order to estimate the Lerner 
index λ, and, consequently, in order to define the behavioral factor , the equation 
(8) is also solved. 
 
5.2.3.1 Evolution of Price and Marginal Costs 
shows the marginal cost evolution for different assumptions. It is also noted 
that the evolution of marginal costs when calculated with the data observed in 
Portugal is very close to the others.  
Whatever the cost function considered, periods when the marginal cost of 
the market approaches the market price succeed to periods when the marginal cost is 
significantly lower than the market price. This is known and has been already 
analysed in other studies (see Fabra and Toro, 2005).  
In addition, extreme weather conditions occurred in some periods, namely 
between November 2001 and January 2002.  
During this period, the increased demand, combined with a period of 
extreme drought, led to the inability of supply to meet demand at certain periods, 
with consequent outages and spikes in electricity prices in the daily and intraday 
markets. However, the beginning of 2001 was characterized by an above-normal 
rainfall that led to the filling of the reservoirs in the Iberian Peninsula. The 
management of reservoirs in Spain during 2001 by the producers of electricity could 
partly be blamed for what happened (Santana and Resende (2006)). The wholesale 
markets for electricity, such as the Iberian market, are markets where producers will 
tend to follow Cournot strategies with capacity constraint due to the design market. 
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The management of hydrological reservoirs by producers of electricity could have 
been influenced by these strategies.  
Figure 1 shows the marginal cost evolution for different assumptions. It is 
also noted that the evolution of marginal costs when calculated with the data 
observed in Portugal is very close to the others.  
Whatever the cost function considered, periods when the marginal cost of 
the market approaches the market price succeed to periods when the marginal cost is 
significantly lower than the market price. This is known and has been already 
analysed in other studies (see Fabra and Toro, 2005).  
In addition, extreme weather conditions occurred in some periods, namely 
between November 2001 and January 2002.  
During this period, the increased demand, combined with a period of 
extreme drought, led to the inability of supply to meet demand at certain periods, 
with consequent outages and spikes in electricity prices in the daily and intraday 
markets. However, the beginning of 2001 was characterized by an above-normal 
rainfall that led to the filling of the reservoirs in the Iberian Peninsula. The 
management of reservoirs in Spain during 2001 by the producers of electricity could 
partly be blamed for what happened (Santana and Resende (2006)). The wholesale 
markets for electricity, such as the Iberian market, are markets where producers will 
tend to follow Cournot strategies with capacity constraint due to the design market. 
The management of hydrological reservoirs by producers of electricity could have 
been influenced by these strategies.  
Figure 1. Changes in market prices and production costs 
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The Lerner Index is an indicator of the exercise of market power. The 
observation of the average annual rates of the Lerner Index, associated with each 
curve of marginal production, listed in Figure 2, shows that by the end of 2003 this 
indicator is in average above marginal curve by 15%, exceeding at times 50%, 
whatever the marginal curve considered. This indicates clearly that there is exercise 
of market power in that period.  
We tried to eliminate the effect of peak prices that occurred between 
November 2001 and February 2002, taking off this period from the analysis. This 
was done for the series "marginal cost b), with higher marginal costs, resulting in a 
lower Lerner index. In this case, the average Lerner is about 7% and 15% in 2001 
and 2002, respectively. However, from 2003 the existence of market power depends 
on the estimate considered for the marginal cost.  
The evolution of the Lerner index can easily be associated with various 
external events. The increase in the Lerner index from 2001 coincides with the threat 
by the European Union to prevent Spain from maintaining the CTC payments. With 
the disappearance of this threat, the Lerner Index was seen to fall. Later, the entry of 
the new combined cycle natural gas power centres whose importance can be 
highlighted from 2004 onwards and which were not governed by the CTCs, 
coincides with a rise in this index. Finally, the implementation of Royal Decree-Law 
no. 3/2006 set a maximum price for trading in the pool amongst companies from the 
same group and offered a strong incentive to reduce the Lerner Index from this date 
onwards.  
Figure 2. Evolution of the Lerner index 
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The series "marginal cost (a)" has, as expected, the higher index, and the 
series "marginal cost b)” is the series with the lowest index. The "marginal cost 
series Portugal" has a value close to this last series. In turn, this is the series that has 
the highest volatility. 
Table 20. Descriptive statistics 
Marginal cost   
(a)
Marginal cost   
(b)
Marginal cost   
Portugal
Observations 102 102 102
Unit: €/MWh €/MWh €/MWh
Minimum 7.976 11.299 11.876
Maximum 42.565 46.960 52.792
Average 24.129 30.101 25.782
Median 20.189 30.363 24.242
Standard deviation 9.712 8.595 9.857
Variance 94.314 73.877 97.169
Kurtosis -1.363 -0.586 -0.468
Skewness 0.215 -0.283 0.703  
 
As it would be expected the series marginal cost Portugal has a higher 
correlation with the series marginal cost (b), with which it shares the assumptions 
used to value the hydro productions. Market price series is noticeably more 
correlated with the series marginal cost (a) and marginal cost Portugal. 
 
Table 21. Marginal costs correlation 
Marginal cost   
(a)
Marginal cost   
(b)
Marginal cost   
Portugal
Electricity 
price
Marginal cost   (a) 1.00 0.76 0.78 0.59
Marginal cost   (b) 0.76 1.00 0.84 0.70
Marginal cost   Portugal 0.78 0.84 1.00 0.68
Electricity price 0.59 0.70 0.68 1.00  
 
After setting the marginal cost as an exogenous variable in the model, it 
remains to consider the stationarity of the series. As noted, the price variable is 
integrated of order 1. The following tables show that this is also the case for 
marginal costs series.  
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Table 22. ADF-Tests for the marginal cost 
Marginal cost (a)
 
(1)
Marginal cost (a)
 
(2)
Marginal cost (b)
(1)
Marginal cost (b)
(2)
Marginal cost 
Portugal
(1)
Marginal cost 
Portugal
(2)
Choosen order 2 2 0 0 0 0
Trend No Yes No Yes No Yes
Statistic test -1.545 -2.147 -1.484 -2.393 -1.440 -2.430
Critical value for the 
ADF statitistic -2.892 -3.457 -2.892 -3.457 -2.892 -3.457  
 
Table 23. ADF-tests for the marginal cost of integrated order 1  
Marginal cost (a) 
I(1)
 (1)
Marginal cost (a) 
I(1)
 (2)
Marginal cost (b) 
I(1)
(1)
Marginal cost (b) 
I(1)
(2)
Marginal cost 
Portugal I(1)
(1)
Marginal cost 
Portugal I(1)
(2)
Choosen order 1 1 0 0 0 0
Trend No Yes No Yes No Yes
Statistic test -7.817 -7.854 -8.807 -8.877 -9.539 -9.609
Critical value for the 
ADF statitistic -2.899 -3.467 -2.899 -3.467 -2.899 -3.467  
 
However, the ADF test for the stationarity of the residuals of the regression 
(7) rejects the hypothesis of a unit root. Given that there is only one independent 
variable, this test is sufficient to test the stationarity of the model (Pesaran and 
Pesaran, 1997). It is expected that the variables “Electricity Price” and "marginal 
cost" are co-integrated, reflecting the relative stability of the mark-up.  
 
Table 24. ADF test for stationarity of residuals (60 observations) 
Marginal cost (a) Marginal cost (b) Marginal cost 
Portugal
Choosen order 1 0 1
Statistic test -4.669 -3.913 -5.880
Critical value for the 
ADF statitistic -3.454 -3.454 -3.454  
 
In the case of the series marginal cost b) without Nov. 01_ Fev.02, despite 
the stationary of equation (7), the tests performed, including Dick-Fuller, point to 
100 
 
European Research Studies,  Volume XV, Issue 4,Special  Issue on Energy, 2012 
 
the existence of autocorrelation of the residuals. Therefore, we applied an 
autoregressive models with 1 lag in order to solve the equation (7) for the period 
between January 1999 and December 2003, for which they have obtained significant 
results for the price elasticity of demand14. The results can be seen in the table 
below. The Lerner indexes have high values. Their interpretation requires the 
resolution of equation (8).  
 
Table 25. Results 
Coefficient T-Ratio [Prob.] Coefficient T-Ratio [Prob.] Coefficient T-Ratio [Prob.] Coefficient T-Ratio [Prob.]
λ 0.38776 9.6156 [0.000] 0.1975 4.4574 [0.000] 0.18326 3.7879 [0.000] 0.41285  20.3947 [0.000]
 AR parameter - - - - 0.56706 Ut (-1) (5.3326) [0.000]  - -
Marginal cost PortugalMarginal cost (b) Marginal cost (b) 
without Nov.01_Feb.02
Marginal cost (a)
 
 
 
5.2.3.2 Definition of the Behavioural Variable for 1999-2003 
When we defined the price elasticity of demand for different functional 
forms, we concluded that only for the 1999 – 2003 period, equation (8) can be 
solved. In section Ошибка! Источник ссылки не найден. we determined the 
HHI, being the average value 30.5%. With regard to price elasticity of demand, the 
estimated values in section Ошибка! Источник ссылки не найден. are very 
similar regardless of functional form chosen. Thus, we applied the results obtained 
for the linear functional form: -0.0886.  
Table 26. Variable behavior of cost estimate for linear demand function  
period 1999-2003 
Marginal cost
(a)
Marginal cost
(b)
Marginal cost
(b) 
without 
Nov.01_Feb.02
Marginal cost 
Portugal
0.119 0.060 0.056 0.126  
 
It should be recalled that the closer  is to 1, the closer we are to finding 
strategic behaviour of the Nash-Cournot type, whereas when it is closer to 0, the 
agents are closer to a competitive situation. Therefore, despite the high mark-up, one 
cannot, apparently, prove the existence of an anti-competitive behavior, using the 
conjectural variation methodology. 
However, we will try to refine the approach. As noted, during the period 
under review the producers of electricity in Spain were framed by CTCs. This 
                                                 
14
 It has to be highlighted that the existence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of the residuals 
led to the adjustment of the regression through the Newey-West matrix of covariances I the other cases. 
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methodology allows the incumbent producers to be compensated for the return on 
investment which was guaranteed before the market liberalization. In other words, 
CTC ensures the recovery of their stranded costs. The scheme was applied whenever 
the market price was less than 36 €/MWh. The compensation was calculated as the 
difference between the income declared by all the distributors for their activities in 
the electricity supply tariff and the costs of regulated activities, which include the 
costs of the energy traded in the market. The allocation of the compensation was 
made taking into account a share initially set for each company, which should reflect 
their stranded costs. Note that the amount of CTC allocated to the second largest 
company, Iberdrola, was lower than its market share, while the CTC allocated to 
Endesa, was higher than its market share. If the market price was higher than 36 
€/MWh, the increased revenue would be deducted from the amounts of CTCs 
established annually. This scheme should be extended for 10 years from 1997.  
Thus, the CTCs were organized similarly to contracts for difference, whose 
revenues were defined as functions that decrease with market prices.  
Therefore, if the CTCs were applied to all quantities traded, the profit 
wouldn’t grow with the market prices. To define the function maximizing the profits 
of a producer i, we reformulated the profit function in a market with CTCs given by 
Fabra and Toro (2005), as follows:  
 
           (29) 
 
Being, qiCTC the quantities framed by the contracts and  the income 
per MWh produced that are allocated to producer i through the CTCs. 
If qiCTC = qi, that is, if the quantities traded framed by CTCs, qiCTC, are 
equal to the quantities traded in the market, the maximization of the equation (28) 
results in: 
 
                                     (30) 
 
In this case, any strategy for maximizing profit is independent of the price 
and we simply need to equate the marginal cost of production at   added of 36 
€ / MWh, which corresponds to equal the marginal revenue (implicit in the scheme 
prior to the  liberalization) and the marginal cost.  
In 1999, almost all conventional power plants were framed by CTCs. The 
weight of the power plants framed by CTCs in total production fell sharply from 
2002, with the entry of new plants (Vives, 2006). 
Thus, in practice qiCTC < q, that is, the quantities traded framed by CTCs, 
qiCTC, are lower than those traded in the market which are independent of this 
mechanism. Assuming qiCTC as a constant, in this case, the profit maximization 
function result as follows: 
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           (31) 
 
 
Rearranging this equation, we obtain the following relationship: 
 
              (32) 
 
This results15 in the following equation: 
 
(33) 
 
The parameter  is the difference between the market share of each 
company and the weight of their respective products framed by the CTC in the total 
production, multiplied by their market shares. Thus, this parameter is the Herfindahl 
index net of the weight of the power plants that give no benefit to producers, 
whenever they developed a strategy to manipulate the market price. 
This parameter is smaller, the greater the weight of the energy produced by 
plants covered by the CTC. In 2003, about 10% of installed power plants did not 
correspond to conventional investments developed during the term of the MLE, that 
is, they weren´t framed by the regime of CTCs. In 1999, the share of power after the 
MLE was only 2%. 
We defined an average value for  considering, for simplicity, that 
the production of plants not covered by the CTCs is proportional to its capacity as 
the weight of the production of these plants is the same for all companies. The 
average value thus found for this parameter was 1.71%.  
Thus, accepting a broad interpretation of   and the relation (8), we can apply 
the following equation: 
 
                 (34) 
 
The obtained values are between values that indicate the existence of 
Cournot strategies, which correspond to the unit, and values that indicate the 
existence of pure strategy of collusion, match . 
                                                 
15
 The development of this deduction comes out of the scope of this paper. 
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Table 27. Variable behavior by cost function considering the CTC  
period 1999-2003 
Marginal cost
(a)
Marginal cost
(b)
Marginal cost 
(b) 
without 
Nov.01_Feb.02
Marginal cost 
Portugal
2.12 1.08 1.00 2.25  
 
The results obtained now clearly indicate that producers behaviors are 
"somewhere" between the Cournot behavior and the pure collusive behavior. This 
results are consistent with what some authors argue (see for exemple Vives, 2006) 
that after the suspicion on the part of producers that from 1999 the payments of 
CTCs could not be made, they may have developed strategies to increase the mark-
up implicit in the market price. 
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
In focussing on causal relationships, the new industrial school aims to infer 
the possible causes of a high level of concentration, such as can be verified in the 
Spanish market for the period under analysis and to determine whether this results 
from anti-competitive behaviour or, on the contrary, from more efficient efforts 
made by companies in the face of their competitors. However, the capacity to 
exercise market power and the realisation of anti-competitive strategies should not 
be confused, as this study demonstrates in terms of electricity production under a 
market regime. This is because, in the case of electricity production, the differences 
between these two trends are more marked than in other sectors, due to their specific 
characteristics. These characteristics take shape in the form of two related trends 
which only partially cancel each other out. On the one hand, electricity production 
can be based on “anti-competitive” strategies, even at relatively low levels of 
concentration, due to its characteristics, which include the price elasticity of demand 
below the unit, the difficulty in storing the product and the fact that it is a capital-
intensive sector, with long periods required for a return on investments. On the other 
hand, this natural tendency to exercise market power and, above all, the fact that 
electricity is an essential commodity, make this sector extremely regulated, even 
when exercised under a market regime, including in economies that are more open 
to private initiatives, limiting the actions of economic agents (sometimes by 
anticipating the future actions of the regulators). 
Thus, due to the nature of the electricity generation, the exercise of market 
power occurs naturally in these markets, and this trend is very often impeded due to 
its framework. In a pioneering study by Wolfram (1999), the author concludes, in 
the case of the former English and Wales market at the end of the 1990s, that prices 
were much higher than marginal costs, demonstrating the existence of market 
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power. However, this difference was less than was to be expected, given the 
structure of the English market at the time. Fears of State intervention in the 
wholesale market can explain the “lower” mark-up. 
This study also points in this direction.  The average Lerner index is high, 
although it is expected to be much higher compared to the market conditions 
(particularly the high concentration and low price elasticity of demand). However, at 
that time the Spanish electricity sector was framed by CTCs, similar to contracts for 
difference, which would, nevertheless, make the average Lerner index lower, since 
the profit maximization function of the producers framed by CTC was independent 
from price strategies. The paper shows that the average high mark-up in the period 
examined is very likely due to the implementation of anti-competitive strategies. 
Therefore, in the Spanish case, the opening of the market without the prior 
increase in the number of market players did not, by itself, prevent the manipulation 
of the market. This trend occurs even with the application of a methodology such as 
the CTC, which should have prevented the implementation of strategies to increase 
the mark-up by companies.  
It could be refuted that a Lerner index based on market price, without the 
capacity payment (which exists in many markets, like Spanish to ensure the 
recovery of fixed costs) may not be a good indicator of power market because the 
prices in the wholesale markets do not always ensure the payment of the fixed costs 
(see Joskow (2006)). However, for the Spanish market during this period, fixed 
costs are partly recovered, taking into account the payment capacity of producers in 
place of about 7.8 € / MWh.  
Finally, we have seen that the use of the structural methodology have 
obtained interesting results, similar to those obtained outside this methodological 
framework. The application of the structural model to the electricity sector was 
performed on the basis of a set of assumptions concerning the underlying economic 
relationships and the functional forms of the functions defining the endogenous 
variables, validated by using estimates for variables outside the framework of the 
structural model. Thus, the price elasticity of demand was defined with values that 
were very close, assuming a linear functional form for demand within the 
framework of the structural models for the values obtained outside this framework 
for log-linear, linear and exponential functional forms.  
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